An Empirical Investigation of the Credit Rationing Hypothesis by Hobdari, Bersant
Insider Ownership and Capital Constraints:  
An Empirical Investigation of the Credit Rationing Hypothesis 
 
 
Bersant HOBDARI 
Department of International Economics and Management,  
Copenhagen Business School 
. 
 
  
Abstract 
 
We analyze the impact of corporate governance structures on access to capital using a unique and rich 
panel data for a large and representative sample of Estonian firms over the period 1993 through 1999.  
We distinguish among five different governance structures and provide estimates on the impact of each 
of them on capital constraints. Our results indicate that: (i) separate regimes exist in investment 
behavior; (ii) the likelihood of being financially constrained is higher in firms that are recently 
privatized, small and where ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders; (iii) soft budget 
constraints lower the probability of a firm being financially constrained; (iv) the actual probabilities of 
operating in the financially constrained regime are calculated to be quite high and essentially stable 
during 1993-1999: 0.52-0.57 for state owned firms, 0.40-0.46 for domestic owned firms and 0.53-0.57 
for employee owned firms. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Corporate Investment, Corporate Governance, Liquidity Constraints, GMM 
Estimates, Switching Regression. 
JEL Classification:      C33, D21, D92, E22, G32, J54, P34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Recently there has been an increased attention to issues related to the impact of the identity and degree 
of concentration of ownership. The starting point of this literature is the potential conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and unmonitored managers. Among the implications of this agency conflict is 
that a firm’s ownership structure is an important determinant of its access to finance and cost of capital. 
Yet, the empirical literature on this issue consists largely of studies based on samples of large publicly 
traded firms where ownership is vastly dispersed and managers enjoy high degrees of discretion. Under 
such conditions, the identity of shareholders does not seem to be of primary importance. Instead, the 
motivation of managers to act in the interests of shareholders is crucial and the aim of the empirical 
analysis is then to establish whether firms with differing degrees of managerial ownership display 
differences in access to capital1. 
 
There exists, however, extensive evidence suggesting in most countries most of the companies are 
controlled by a single large shareholder (La Porta et. al., 1999, Claessens et. al., 2000, Faccio and 
Lang, 2002). The situation confronting many economies that went through the economic transition 
phase is quite similar insofar as the movement away from state ownership led to the emergence of 
diverse concentrated ownership structures. On many instances insiders, i.e., employees and/or 
managers, emerged as majority or dominant owners or, even when they possessed minority ownership, 
enjoyed substantial degrees of control. Under these circumstances the primary agency conflict becomes 
the one between majority and minority shareholders (La Porta et. al., 1998)  
 
The point of departure is thus the recognition that the effect of liquidity constraints is not evenly 
distributed across firms with some firms facing higher costs when raising capital than do others. 
Various theoretical arguments point to firms under insider ownership facing higher likelihood of being 
more constrained in raising capital than others. The literature on employee ownership (Dow, 2003), 
stresses a host of factors such as member’ wealth position, their time horizon, risk attitudes, goal 
structure and the structure of property rights in the firm that make employee owners prefer taking the 
residual in the form of higher income rather than investing it in the firm. This preference along with 
employee owners’ potential aversion to accepting new members lead to potential goal conflict between 
insiders and outside providers of both equity and debt capital. In addition, the fact that most of these 
firms are small and not listed in the stock markets exacerbates informational asymmetries and makes 
access to desired capital more difficult. The net effect of the interaction of these factors could be that 
outside investors might be reluctant to invest in employee owned firms or, when they do invest, the risk 
premium they charge is substantially higher than the market one.  
 
The literature on managerial ownership stresses that an initial increase in managerial ownership is 
beneficial because it better aligns the interests of managers and shareholders and, consequently, lowers 
managerial discretion. However, at high levels, managerial ownership is associated with entrenchment 
and divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. In transition economies the possibility 
of entrenchment and subsequent rent seeking or asset stripping behavior on the part of managers has 
been an argument against managerial ownership. The likelihood of this happening depends to a large 
extent on the efficiency of market for corporate control. In an environment of high uncertainty and 
infantile capital markets, informational asymmetries might lead to adverse selection problems in the 
market for corporate control (Earle and Estrin, 1996). These arguments imply that, in a transition 
economy environment, ownership concentration in the hands of managers is likely to lead to managers’ 
entrenchment, which in itself exacerbates informational asymmetries and leads to more expensive 
external finance.  
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of various ownership structures on firm’s access to finance by 
explicitly modeling liquidity constraints in firm’s investment decisions. The analysis is carried out 
employing a rich panel data set of companies from Estonia. The study contributes to the literature in 
several ways. First, it contributes to the debate in the corporate governance literature on the effect of 
governance through ownership. Second, it accounts for the effect of governance structures in 
investment decisions through their role in mitigating or exacerbating informational asymmetries and 
agency costs. To our knowledge no prior study exists that empirically investigates this issue in such 
detail2. Third, by using data from one of the most advanced transition economies, it assesses the long-
run viability of certain ownership forms. Fourth, by calculating probabilities of firms’ operating in the 
financially constrained regime we are able to provide evidence of the pervasiveness of financial 
constraints across groups of firms and their persistence over time. Finally, we provide evidence on 
differences in propensity to invest by ownership structure.    
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the methodology employed, present the 
estimation strategies and introduce the data. We then proceed with reporting and discussing the results 
of the impact of corporate governance structures on liquidity constraints. The final section is devoted to 
implications of findings and conclusions.  
 Methodology and Data 
Our primary interest is the relationship between corporate governance structures and liquidity 
constraints.  We investigate this issue in two alternative set-ups: first, in a dynamic setting in the 
presence of adjustment costs, liquidity constraints and imperfect competition and under both debt and 
equity constraints, and second, in a switching regression framework with endogenous and unknown 
sample separation.  
 
In the first set-up we follow Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) and estimate a structural 
dynamic investment equation where investment rates, measured as ratio of investment to capital, are 
regressed on corporate governance dummies and several control variables. Control variables include 
lagged investment rates, sales and labor costs per unit of capital, internal funds (measured by the sum 
of cash flow, short-term assets and revenue from sale of non-current assets), external funds (measured 
by the amount of outstanding debt), industry, time and size dummies.  
 
A major problem in estimating such specifications with governance variables as right-hand side 
variables is endogeneity of ownership3, i.e., in equilibrium different owners will determine their 
optimal ownership share based on various firm characteristics, firm’s investment needs included. In the 
presence of endogeneity we opt to first divide the sample into different sub-samples according to the 
pre-defined ownership groups and then estimate the relevant specifications for every sub-sample 
separately. In the interpretation of results we subsequently focus on the differences in respective 
coefficients across ownership groups, which provide unbiased estimates of the true differences. 
 
A limitation of this approach is that, in general, the partition indicator will be correlated with the 
dependent variable, i.e., with investment in this case, and this will lead to endogenous selection 
problems. The ad hoc selection of partition criteria is, therefore, likely to cause what might be called 
static misclassification. Furthermore, over time firms might move from one regime to the other, i.e., at 
one point in time they might be financially unconstrained, while at some other point in time they might 
be financially constrained. Even assuming that the static partition avoids any misclassification, i.e., 
firms are correctly classified as financially constrained and unconstrained, over time the issue of what 
might be called dynamic misclassification arises. This issue becomes more important as the time period 
under consideration gets longer. To tackle both the static and dynamic misclassifications we introduce 
a switching regression approach with endogenous and unknown sample separation. 
 
A switching regression model is based on the existence of a switching function that determines whether 
a firm is in one of several potential regimes. In the current set-up, at any given point in time, the firm is 
assumed to be in either the financially constrained or financially unconstrained regime. Firms being in 
the financially constrained regime face a higher sensitivity to availability of internal finance than those 
being in the financially unconstrained regime. But, while the number of regimes is known, the 
particular regime a firm belongs to is determined by the switching function, which in itself depends on 
those variables that theoretically determine the wedge between internal and external finance, severity 
of information and agency problems and time-varying firm characteristics. The model consists of three 
equations, i.e., two investment equations and the switching equation, which are estimated 
simultaneously. Once equations are estimated, the respective probabilities of the firm being in either 
regime are calculated. 
 
In estimating the model, functional forms for both the investment and switching equations need to be 
specified. Here it is assumed that the investment equation corresponds to the one derived from 
neoclassical/accelerator models of investment demand as, for example, in Jorgenson (1963). In its basic 
form the neoclassical/accelerator model is derived under the assumption that the supply of investment 
funds is perfectly elastic and, consequently does not allow financial constraints to affect investment. 
Usually, in the literature, profit or cash flow variables are included in empirical specifications to 
account for the possibility of imperfect substitutability of internal and external finance. In terms of the 
switching function it is assumed to be a function of two sets of variables: those that determine firm's 
financial status and those that measure the degree of information and agency problems. The former set 
of variables includes balance sheet and income statement items, such as debt to capital ratio, interest 
expenses and liquid financial assets to capital ratio. The latter set of variables includes the percentage 
of shares owned by the largest owner, as a measure of ownership concentration, firm's age and firm 
size. Time and industry dummies complete the set of explanatory variables of the switching function. 
The straightforward interpretation of the coefficients of these dummies is that they represent the effects 
of general macroeconomic conditions4 on the probability of a firm being financially constrained. As 
these conditions are the same for all the firms in the economy or in an industry, then their sum 
constitutes the threshold over which a firm will be classified as financially constrained based on its 
own characteristics. Given that being financially constrained at any given moment in time will depend 
on past performance and results, all variables in the switching function other than time and industry 
dummies enter in the first lag.  
 
The effect of financial variables on the probability of being financially constrained, however, would be 
insignificant or be significantly reduced if firms would enjoy easy access to capital or experience soft 
budget constraints. Soft budget constraints include not only cheap capital in the form of direct subsidies 
from state but also in the form of tax arrears, trade credits, i.e., delayed payments to suppliers and 
cheap loans from the banking sector5. The relative importance of these channels is difficult to evaluate 
due to the lack of appropriate data, as is the case with tax arrears, or the noise contained in the available 
data, as in the case with trade credit and bank loans. Nevertheless, given the data in hand, a measure of 
soft budget constraints is constructed and included in the set of variables that determine the probability 
of being financially constrained. The measure is constructed as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if a firm, at a given point in time, has negative earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD) 
and, at the same time, receives positive net financing defined as an increase in short-term debt net of 
financing costs.  
 
The data used in this paper consist of annual firm-level observations from a large and representative 
sample of Estonian firms over the period 1993 through 1999. The sample is created through a 
combination of data obtained from surveys and from standard firm financial statements reported to the 
Estonian Statistical Office. The aim of surveys is to obtain information on ownership configurations, 
which is not available in standard financial statements. The firms included in the survey scheme are 
selected as a stratified random sample based on size and industrial affiliation. The survey information 
is then augmented with financial information from balance sheet and income statements, such as 
current and fixed assets, current and long-term liabilities, sales, wages and salaries, inventories, gross 
and net profit, expenditure on capital goods and investment. 
 
*** Table 1 approximately here *** 
 
The list and definitions of variables used in the analysis are given in Table 1, while Table 2 provides 
information on the distribution at a given point in time and evolution over time of the number of firms 
that fall in a given ownership category. We classified firms into one of the categories using the number 
of shares held by the largest owner. Focusing on the 1995 sample, it is apparent that, in more than 22% 
of cases, insiders, i.e., employees and managers, or former insiders are dominant owners. This provides 
evidence to the importance of insider ownership during the early years of transition. Foreign owned 
companies comprise around 12% of the sample, with most of them being new companies established as 
joint ventures in the early 1990s, while domestic outsider owned firms comprise around 18% of the 
sample. Finally, state owned firms comprise around 48% of the sample, with 232 firms being 100% in 
state ownership while 30 firms being mostly in private hands but with the state still holding the 
dominant position6.  
 
*** Table 2 approximately here *** 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the most relevant variables used in the analysis. The general 
facts that emerge from this table are that investment levels are high relative to capital stock, with 
investment/capital ratio ranging from 0.17 in 1993 to 0.34 in 1995, that average employment decreases 
while real wage increases over time, that cash flow is positive, that short-term debt increases over time 
and that cash flow and short-term debt are approximately of the same magnitude in all years but 1996. 
The increase in debt after 1995 is consistent with the general increase of lending to the private sector 
during this period in Estonia. Furthermore, up to 1997, the sum of cash flow and short-term debt is less 
than investment suggesting that firms might have had access to other sources of capital such as short-
term trade credit and/or long-term debt. 
 
*** Table 3 approximately here *** 
 
This conjecture is supported by the last two rows of the table that show current payables and long-term 
liabilities, which include long-term loans as well as any other long-term debt a firm accumulates. The 
rate of growth of long-term liabilities is not high, except for the last year, suggesting that long-term 
liabilities do not constitute an important source of capital over the stated period. Current payables, 
however, are quite high and higher than investment over the whole period. Another important feature 
of Estonian firms during this period is that, on average, they have become more capital intensive as 
demonstrated by the increase in capital and decrease in employment.  
 
Empirical Results  
The results of estimating the structural dynamic investment equation for each ownership group 
separately, using Arellano’s and Bond's (1991) GMM procedure, are reported in Table 4. In terms of 
overall model performance we see that the over-identifying restrictions, tested through Sargan’s test, 
are accepted at high probability levels, while the second order autocorrelation test is always rejected. 
Also, adjusted R-squared are comparable across equations and range from around 18% to around 22%. 
Finally, model adequacy is also confirmed by the rejection of the null that all coefficients are jointly 
zero. 
 
*** Table 4 approximately here *** 
Turning to estimates of structural parameters we see that the adjustment cost parameter and the optimal 
investment/capital ratio are positive and significant across all equations, while the market power 
parameter is significant in the case of domestic outsider owned and foreign owned firms. The estimates 
of adjustment cost parameters imply different relative size of adjustment costs to investment 
expenditures across ownership groups. Assuming that parameter b  is zero and evaluating the size of 
adjustment costs at the mean investment/capital ratio for each group, we find that adjustment costs for 
foreign owned firms vary between 16% and 19% of investment expenditures, for domestic outsider 
owned firms between 20% and 22%, for manager owned firms between 29% and 36%, for employee 
owned firms between 30% and 36% and for state owned firms between 27% and 34%. When optimal 
investment/capital ratios are compared with their sample means across ownership groups we find that 
state owned firms have the lowest deviation of actual versus optimal investment rate, while manager 
and employee owned firms have the highest. This suggest that, even accounting for the non zero value 
of  in calculating adjustment costs, manager and employee owned firms will face large adjustment 
costs relative to investment expenditures. Finally, the estimates of market power parameter are 
insignificant for state owned, manager owned and employee owned firms. In contrast, the values of this 
parameter for domestic outsider and foreign owned firms are positive, significant and well above unity, 
indicating that these firms operate in the elastic portion of their demand curve and enjoy monopoly 
power.  
b
 
Important differences in investment behavior across ownership groups emerge while inspecting the 
estimates of financial variables’ coefficients. Comparing the coefficients across groups several things 
are worth noting. First, as expected, different types of firms display different sensitivity to measures of 
financial constraints. Estimates of all coefficients of financial variables for foreign owned firms are 
insignificant, indicating that these firms are not constrained in any sense in their investment behavior. 
Given that foreign owned firms in Estonia might be either subsidiaries or joint ventures with foreign 
partners, it is highly possible that profits earned in other countries could be invested in Estonia and the 
other way round. As such, the measures of internal funds and debt as defined here will not be the 
relevant ones for these firms. Instead, measures of global funds across different markets where these 
firms operate will be needed to describe their behavior.  
 
Other types of firms, albeit to differing degrees, display sensitivity to the availability of internal and/or 
external finance. Manager owned firms are the only ones among them not displaying significant 
sensitivity to the availability of internal funds, while state owned, domestic outside owned and 
employee owned firms all display positive and significant sensitivity to measures of internal funds, 
implying different degrees of financing constraints. Among the latter three groups, the sensitivity is 
highest for employee owned firms and then for state owned ones. For instance, the estimate of internal 
funds parameter for employee owned firms is 0.052. This estimate is 30% larger than the one for state 
owned firms and almost twice as large as the one for domestic outsider owned ones. The estimate of 
internal funds squared parameter, included to capture potential non-linearities, is significant only for 
employee owned firms, indicating that for these firms availability of internal finance is crucial in 
investment policies.   
 
Further evidence of financial constraints comes from the inspection of coefficients of external finance 
variables. In this case, state owned firms display no sensitivity to availability of external finance, as 
shown by the insignificant coefficients of debt and its squared parameters. This could serve as indicator 
that state owned firms are not as constrained as might be conjectured in raising external finance, i.e. 
they might be operating under soft budget constraints regime. Alternatively, it could be conjectured 
that, due to high price they might have to pay for external finance, they rely mostly on internal funds to 
finance their investment, as expressed by the positive and significant coefficient of internal funds 
parameters, and, as such, have not yet hit their credit limit. Further, the significant coefficient of 
internal finance and the insignificant coefficient of external finance could also be interpreted as 
evidence of managerial preferences against outside control. In contrast, all other domestic owned firms, 
seem to have hit their debt limit in that, whenever significant, higher levels of debt are associated with 
lower investment rates. The sensitivities are highest, in absolute value, for employee owned firms and 
then for domestic outsider owned firms across all specifications. Interestingly, the case of manager 
owned firms is the opposite of that of state owned firms, in that they show significant sensitivity to the 
availability of external finance but insignificant sensitivity to the availability of internal funds. An 
important overall conclusion is that financial constraints operate both through debt and availability of 
internal funds, although the coefficients of internal funds are significant more often than those of 
external finance. 
 
*** Table 5 approximately here *** 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the switching regression model. Part 1 of Table 5 reports the 
investment equation estimated, which includes lagged sales, twice lagged sales, lagged cash flow, twice 
lagged cash flow, lagged financial slack and twice lagged financial slack, all normalized with lagged 
capital stock, along with time and industry dummies, as right hand side variables. A positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of cash flow for firms operating in the financially constrained regime 
would mean that these firms are sensitive to the availability of internal finance and, consequently, 
credit rationed with respect to external finance. Furthermore, it is customary in the empirical studies of 
advanced market economies that a statistically insignificant coefficient of cash flow for firms operating 
in not financially constrained regime is interpreted as sign that these firms are indifferent in choosing 
between internal and external finance and, hence, are unconstrained financially. Yet, another argument 
states that cash flow may also convey information about future profitability other than the degree of 
financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). In this case the coefficient of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity would be positive and statistically significant even for the not financially constrained firms, 
but the absolute value of this coefficient would be lower than that for the financially constrained firms. 
In the transition context, we expect cash flow to be an important conveyor of information on firm’s 
future profitability. Consequently, we expect cash flow coefficients to be different from zero even for 
the unconstrained firms.  
 
In addition to cash flow, the investment equations include a measure of financial slack, defined as the 
sum of cash, short-term receivables, short-term securities and revenue obtained from the sale of non-
current tangible assets. Differently from cash flow, this variable measures only the availability of 
internal funds and will, consequently, provide further evidence on the existence of credit rationing. The 
assumption here is that measures of financial slack are not likely to be positively correlated with firm’s 
future opportunities. This assumption might be violated, however, when voluntary asset sale is 
determined by the lack of future growth opportunities rather than restructuring considerations. If this is 
the case then the coefficient of financial slack would be biased against finding a liquidity effect. Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) argue that high levels of financial slack are associated with the lack of financial 
constraints, given that investment will not be conditioned by the availability of finance. On the other 
hand, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1996) and Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) argue that high 
levels of financial slack might be associated with financial constraints given that it is those firms that 
expect to be constrained which accumulate large holdings of liquidity. These arguments mean that, for 
financially constrained firms the coefficient of financial slack variables is expected to be positive and 
statistically significant, pointing to the inability of these firms to substitute between internal and 
external finance, while for financially unconstrained firms the coefficient of financial slack variables is 
expected to be not different from zero, indicating that they can freely switch between internal and 
external financing. 
 
The coefficient estimates of output and measures of internal funds across both regimes are mostly 
statistically significant and of the expected sign, indicating strong support for the 
neoclassical/accelerator model. Turning to differences in investment behavior across the two regimes 
we see that the coefficients of lagged cash flow are significant at 1% and 5% significance level. 
Furthermore, as expected, lagged cash flow coefficient is larger for financially constrained firms than 
for financially non-constrained firms, i.e., 0,015 versus 0,004. This supports the belief that financially 
constrained firms are more sensitive to the availability of internal finance than financially 
unconstrained firms. In addition, the coefficient of twice lagged cash flow is positive and statistically 
significant only for firms operating in financially constrained regime. This could be interpreted as 
evidence of cash smoothing hypothesis, i.e., the fact that, given their inability to secure all desired level 
of financing when a profitable investment project will be undertaken, financially constrained firms 
accumulate internal funds over time and use them to finance these projects. Further evidence of 
different sensitivities to availability of internal funds across firms operating in the two regimes is given 
by the coefficient of lagged financial slack variable and its twice lagged value. These coefficients are 
positive and significant at 1% and 5% significance level only for financially constrained firms, 
implying that these firms accumulate large holdings of liquidity to substitute for their inability to obtain 
external finance. In contrast, respective coefficients for financially unconstrained firms are positive but 
insignificant, suggesting that these firms could easily substitute between internal and external finance. 
Finally, support for the hypothesis of different investment behavior across groups is provided by the 
coefficient estimates of sales and its lagged value. All coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% and 10% significance level, but they are larger in absolute value for unconstrained 
firms than for constrained firms. This is consistent with the hypothesis that unconstrained firms are 
able to react more to the prospect of future growth opportunities, summarized by the sales variable, 
than the firms operating in the constrained regime7.     
 
The identification of separate investment regimes is further supported by the estimates of the switching 
function reported in part 2 of Table 5. Other than the balance sheet variables, we have included in the 
specification the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner, its interaction with respective 
ownership dummies, firm size, firm age and a dummy denoting whether the firm is subject to soft 
budget constraints or not. Firm size is measured by the logarithm of the average number of employees, 
while firm age is measured by the number of years the firm has been operating in private hands8. The 
interpretation of this coefficient is the marginal change in the probability of operating in the 
constrained regime from operating one more year under private ownership.  
 
An important general conclusion that emerges from the results is that ownership type is important 
determinant of the likelihood whether the firm is financially constrained or not. As expected, the 
coefficient of the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner is significant indicating that some 
ownership concentration is important in determining the regime a firm operates. The signs of the 
coefficients of interaction terms indicate that higher ownership concentration in the hands of either the 
state or employees is associated with higher probability of being financially constrained. In between 
these groups, when ownership is concentrated in the hands of the state the effect is twice as large as 
when ownership is concentrated in the hands of employees. Interestingly, there seems to be no 
significant effect on the likelihood of being financially constrained when ownership is concentrated in 
the hands of the other owner types.  
 
*** Table 6 approximately here *** 
 
An advantage of using the switching regression approach is that it allows us to calculate probabilities 
that firms will operate in one or the other regime. In Table 6 we report probabilities that firms, 
belonging to different ownership groups, operate in the financially constrained regime. Several 
important facts emerge from the table. First, probabilities of being financially constrained are quite 
high and seem to be rather stable over time. Second, consistent with the finding that the identity of 
owners matters with respect to access to finance, there are substantial differences in probabilities across 
ownership groups. Third, firms under foreign ownership face the lowest probability of being 
financially constrained. This is consistent with the argument that foreign owners either have access to 
alternative capital markets or manage to crowd out domestic demand for capital. Finally, insider owned 
firms face higher probability of being financially constrained than private outsider owned firms. We 
perform mean difference tests, not reported here, to check the statistical significance of these 
differences for each pair of ownership groups for every year. In no case are we able to accept the null 
that insider and private outsider owned firms have equal probabilities of being financially constrained.     
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, using new and rich panel data for a large and representative sample of Estonian firms we 
investigate the impact of corporate governance structures on liquidity constraints. The investment 
behavior of firms is examined in two alternative set-ups: firstly in a dynamic setting in the presence of 
adjustment costs, liquidity constraints and imperfect competition and under both debt and equity 
constraints, and secondly in a switching regression framework with endogenous and unknown sample 
separation. The Generalized Method of Moments and Switching Regression estimates confirm the 
importance of financial factors in determining investment rates and suggest that firms owned by 
insiders, especially non-managerial employees, are more prone to be liquidity constrained than are 
others.  
 
Our results contribute to the debate on the efficiency and viability of various ownership structures. The 
arguments in the debate could be well summarized in Hansmann’s (1996) survivorship test, which says 
that if a given organizational form does not survive, then it must have been at a comparative 
disadvantage compared to other forms. One of the organizational structures that, on various theoretical 
grounds, has been pinpointed as inefficient, and, as such, subject to extinction, is employee owned 
firms. The theoretical arguments have given rise to empirical work that tries to assess the inefficiency 
of employee owned firms. The results of this work, however, suggest that employee owned firms do 
not always perform worse than other alternatives. For instance, for the Baltic countries Jones and 
Mygind (2000) provide evidence that employee owned firms do not perform worse than other Estonian 
privately owned firms. In reality, however, employee ownership is in decline and Estonia is not an 
exception in this respect. Consequently, other than inherent inefficiency, there might be other factors 
that affect their survival. In fact, evidence exist, in for instance Mygind (1997), that in the Baltic 
countries employee owned firms face unwillingness on the part of financial institutions to lend to them 
or, when they obtain loans those loans have very high interest rates, which instead of rational risk 
assessment on the part of financial institutions points towards discrimination in the credit market. 
 
With respect to the likelihood of firms being financially constrained or not, our findings point to the 
importance of the firm’s balance sheet position, as well as to variables that proxy the severity of 
information asymmetry and agency costs. In general, our results indicate that firms with a weak 
balance sheet position and those facing more severe asymmetric information and agency costs 
problems are more likely to operate in the financially constrained regime. More specifically, a higher 
ratio of debt to capital, a bigger ratio of interest coverage to sales, and a lower liquidity to capital ratio 
increase the probability of a firm being financially constrained. This probability is also higher for 
newly privatized and smaller firms, as well as for those in which ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of insiders and the state. We also find that the existence of soft budget constraints lowers the 
probability of a firm being financially constrained. When actual probabilities of operating in the 
financially constrained regime are calculated, it is found that they are quite high and basically stable 
during the whole period. Overall, the analysis has shown the importance of different capital market 
imperfections in firm’s investment decisions.  
 
Finally, our conclusions point to the importance of ownership configurations for both investment 
behavior and the likelihood of facing financial constraints. As expected firms whose ownership 
structures are dominated by insiders face higher probability of being financially constrained and 
display higher sensitivity to availability of internal finance.  
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1 There are, however, studies that have analyzed the role of alternative governance structures on investment behavior. For 
instance, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) analyze the role that membership in industrial groups, which are 
characterized by extensive crossholding, plays in investment behavior of Japanese firms. Furthermore, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001) investigate how ownership concentration in the hands of institutional investors affects liquidity 
constraints for a sample of companies listed in the London Stock Exchange. 
2 There exist only a few studies on developed economies mainly due to the low incidence of such firms in these economies. 
Examples include Jones and Backus (1977) study on British producer cooperatives, Estrin and Jones (1998) study on 
French producer cooperatives and Bartlett et. al. (1992) study on Italian cooperatives. Transition economies constitute a 
fertile ground for such studies given the high incidence of insider, both managerial and employee, ownership in post 
privatization ownership configurations. Nevertheless, studies on firm-level investment in transition do not yet abound. 
However, as data become more available so do the studies. Examples of studies where authors explicitly address the issue 
of insider ownership are Anderson and Kegels (1997) and Lizal and Svejnar (2002a, 2002b) for the Czech Republic and 
Prasnikar and Svejnar (1999) for Slovenia.   
3 Although the use of instrumental variables could be called upon to account for the endogenous ownership structures, there 
are two major problems with this approach. The first problem has to do with the quality of instruments. In general, finding 
appropriate instruments for ownership dummies is difficult. The literature concerning the determinants of ownership 
structures is large and it has identified several factors influencing the choice of optimal ownership shares, such as firm size, 
productivity, profitability, capital intensity, financing requirements or firm quality. In principle, all these variables could 
serve as instruments for the endogenous ownership dummies. The application of the instrumental variable approach requires 
all these instruments to be uncorrelated with the unobserved variables. In structural investment equations, however, all 
factors mentioned will be correlated with unobserved firm specific shocks to investment and, as such, still be correlated 
with the error terms. Then, the use of such bad instruments, as Angrist and Krueger (2001) point out, will still lead to biased 
parameter estimates.  
Instead of using the potential instruments to substitute for the endogenous ownership dummies in the regression, a two-step 
procedure could be adopted. At the beginning, first-stage predicted probabilities of a firm being under a given ownership 
structure are generated, through the estimation of a probit or logit regression, and then, in the second stage, these predicted 
probabilities are included in the main regression instead of the ownership dummies. While this approach sounds appealing, 
it has a drawback in that the use of nonlinear first stage predicted values in the second stage equation will not generate 
consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model happens to be specified exactly right, leading so to misspecification bias. 
Getting the functional form of ownership equations right, however, is not trivial. Financing requirements are one of the 
determinants of optimal ownership shares. What matters, however, for a forward-looking firm are not only current financing 
requirements but also future ones. Assume, for instance, that two similar firms are randomly allocated to managers. In the 
process of financing restructuring both firms will have to raise capital, but one might need more funds than the other. If the 
manager of this firm expects that his/her credit constraint will be binding in the future, then he/she might decide to issue 
equity that will subsequently dilute his/her ownership share. A fully specified model of ownership determinants will have to 
contain measures of such future financing requirements.    
4 An example would be a banking crisis or economywide productivity shocks that affect similarly all firms in the economy. 
5 Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) include also the imposition of import restrictions, trade barriers and/or ease of pressure 
from foreign competition as form of soft budget constraints. Estonia is the most liberal country in Europe in terms of trade 
barriers and restrictions and as such we do not expect this form of soft budget constraints to have played any role in 
Estonian firms’ performance.  
6 If the focus of the analysis had been simply the effect of private ownership versus state ownership these firms would have 
been classified as private ones. As the identity of private owners, however, matters in explaining differences in observed 
behavior, these firms end up being classified as state owned.  
7 The existence of two distinct regimes could be more formally tested using appropriate likelihood ratio tests. Testing, 
however, is not straightforward. The reason is that, in such models, under the restriction that coefficients of the two 
investment equations are equal, the parameters of the switching equation are not identified, which makes it difficult to 
calculate degrees of freedom. In addition, the likelihood ratio test statistic might not be asymptotically distributed as 
distribution. However, Goldfeld and Quandt (1976) have suggested that the likelihood ratio test can be performed using 
a distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the sum of the number of constraints and the number of unidentified 
parameters. The critical value of distribution at 5% significance level with 45 degrees of freedom is 50,71, while the 
respective value of likelihood ratio tests is 517,264. These values lead to decisive rejections of the null hypothesis of a 
single regime. 
8 Given that most of the firms in our sample are former state owned firms, it would have made no sense to define firm’s age 
with the absolute number of years the firm has been in operation, since most firms have been operating many years before 
                                                                                                                                                                       
transition started. At that time, however, investment needs of these firms and allocation of resources were determined by 
central planners.  
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Investment 
 
 
 
Capital 
 
 
Employment 
 
Labor Cost 
Average Wage 
Sales 
Profit 
 
Cash Flow 
Value Added 
 
 
 
Debt 
Current Liabilities 
Total Liabilities 
 
Short-Term Assets 
Financial Cost 
 
Extra Revenue 
 
Industry Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Size Groups 
 
 
 
Ownership Groups 
 
 
Ownership Category 
 
The sum of investments in reconstruction, expansion and acquisition of 
buildings, in constructions of new buildings and other business related 
projects, in buying new machinery, equipment and means of transportation 
and in buying and improving land. 
The book value of non-current tangible assets. It is calculated as the 
average of the value of these assets at the beginning and at the end of the 
year.  
The average number of employees per year. The study has excluded all 
firms with fewer than 10 employees. 
The sum of wage and salaries in a given year. 
The ratio of labor cost to average employment in a given year. 
Net sales per year as stated in firm’s income statement. 
Net profit per year as stated in firm's income statement. This is profit left 
after all taxes are paid. 
The sum of depreciation allowances and net profit. 
Two definitions of value added are adopted. The first is the sum of 
depreciation allowances, net profit, labor cost and expenditures for social 
tax and health insurance. The second includes all these variables as well as 
financial costs. 
The sum of short-term loans. 
The sum of short-term loans and payables to suppliers and or customers.  
The sum of short and long-term loans and other short and long-term 
liabilities. 
The sum of cash, short-term receivables and short-term securities. 
The net of financial income accrued and financial cost incurred during a 
given year.  
Revenue obtained from sale of non-current tangible assets over a given 
period. 
7 broad industry groups were defined as follows: 1. Agriculture and 
fishing. 2. Mining, food products, textile and leather. 3. Wood products, 
paper products, coke, petroleum, chemicals, rubber, plastic, non-metallic, 
basic metals and machinery and equipment production. 4. Electrical, 
optical and transport equipment production. 5. Energy and construction. 6. 
Wholesale and retail trade. 7. Transport.  
Firms are divided into three size groups according to their average 
employment. The first group includes firms with 49 or fewer employees, 
the second includes the firms with more than 49 employees and fewer than 
101, and the third group includes firms with more than 101 employees. 
6 ownership groups are defined as follows: state, foreign, institutional 
domestic outsiders, former employees, incumbent employees and 
managers.  
A firm is considered to be dominantly owned by the owner who holds the 
largest share. 
 
Table 2. Ownership Distribution Over Time According to Dominant Owner1   
Year 
 
Ownership Group 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Domestic Outsiders 81 94 97 110 95 90 119 686
Employee 48 54 47 41 27 26 29 272
Former Employees 0 0 11 14 19 15 16 75
Foreign 42 60 63 68 67 59 72 431
Managers 45 53 65 76 81 71 84 475
State 228 181 262 204 172 123 6 1,176
No Answer 54 56 1 19 18 31 179
Total 498 498 545 514 480 402 357 3294
1A firm is considered to be dominantly owned by the owner who holds the largest share. 
 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Principal Variables Over Time 
Year 
 
Variables1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Obs.2
Investment 2150 
(12363) 
2245 
(18844) 
3371 
(22029) 
3007 
(17249) 
2634 
(15504) 
3407 
(14019) 
4547 
(19549) 
3283 
Capital 12250 
(51023) 
9740 
(48137) 
9771 
(45305) 
10329 
(47218) 
10411 
(47756) 
11200 
(49623) 
16816 
(43022) 
3294 
Sales 21773 
(63301) 
21502 
(61562) 
30377 
(93119) 
24269 
(69179) 
27573 
(77562) 
27989 
(63535) 
32816 
(88789) 
3294 
Employment3 196 
(414) 
166 
(340) 
164 
(388) 
161 
(393) 
157 
(276) 
137 
(282) 
124 
(228) 
3294 
Real Wage4 14.42 
(17.11) 
16.46 
(10.91) 
13.31 
(7.73) 
21.04 
(30.59) 
21.92 
(17.28) 
22.96 
(14.63) 
28.37 
(18.33) 
3294 
Cash Flow 805 
(7530) 
649 
(8801) 
1103 
(10008) 
658 
(12607) 
1678 
(14428) 
1994 
(18195) 
2932 
(17328) 
3294 
Debt 867 
(2692) 
891 
(4112) 
1389 
(3974) 
1701 
(4007) 
1717 
(3664) 
2276 
(3885) 
2962 
(4127) 
3294 
Current 
Payables 
5516 
(23301) 
4848 
(21130) 
3804 
(11895) 
4334 
(12503) 
4363 
(10672) 
4605 
(12843) 
5445 
(15750) 
3294 
Long-Term 
Liabilities  
2595 
(14961) 
2702 
(19652) 
3143 
(12450) 
3433 
(12048) 
3820 
(13874) 
4469 
(12052) 
6863 
(16384) 
3294 
1All the variables except employment are expressed in thousands of Estonian kroons and in 1993 prices 
2This number is the sum over the whole sample with non-missing values for the respective variable 
3Average number of employees in a given year 
4Real average wage per employee 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. GMM Estimates of Investment Functions by Ownership Groupa
 
 
Parameters 
State Domestic 
Outsider 
Foreign Manager Employee 
Adjustment Cost 
Parameter,  a
2.739*** 
(4.22) 
1.923** 
(1.67) 
1.385*** 
(4.73) 
2.313** 
(1.22) 
3.017*** 
(2.56) 
Optimal Investment- 
Capital Ratio,  b
0.21** 
(2.02) 
0.19*** 
(7.27) 
0.17** 
(2.27) 
0.12** 
(1.11) 
0.11** 
(2.09) 
Market Power 
Parameter, η  
0.87 
(0.94) 
1.25*** 
(3.79) 
1.38** 
(1.78) 
0.93* 
(1.62) 
0.82 
(0.78) 
Internal Funds 
Parameter 
0.04*** 
(3.23) 
0.027** 
(1.32) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
0.018 
(0.74) 
0.052*** 
(3.68) 
Internal Funds Squared 
Parameter 
0.0012 
(0.98) 
0.0001 
(0.18) 
0.0001 
(1.01) 
0.003 
(0.97) 
0.002* 
(1.64) 
External Funds 
Parameter 
- 0.004 
(- 0.68) 
   - 0.022*** 
      (- 3.00) 
- 0.00001 
(- 0.37) 
   - 0.021*** 
      (- 3.26) 
- 0.051** 
(- 1.78) 
External Funds Squared 
Parameter 
0.0002 
(0.86) 
- 0.002 
(- 1.16) 
0.0004 
(1.15) 
 - 0.0009*** 
     (- 3.85) 
- 0.012** 
    (- 1.84) 
F-test 
5% Critical Value 
12.34 
1.75 
12.65 
1.75 
15.76 
1.75 
9.64 
1.75 
9.45 
1.75 
Sargan's Statistic 
Degrees of Freedom 
P-value 
21.76 
14 
0.12 
20.57 
14 
0.13
20.96 
14 
0.12
14.08 
14 
0.42 
21.07 
14 
0.11
Second Order 
Autocorrelation Test 
P-value 
0.46 
0.64 
0.45 
0.64 
-0.86 
0.37 
-1.04 
0.29 
-1.03 
0.27 
No. of Observations 303 241 254 277 212 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.191 0.186 0.218 0.209 0.205 
a Values in brackets denote respective t-statistics. Each model is estimated with time, industry and size dummies, whose 
estimates are not reported here. Internal funds are measured by the sum of cash flow, short-term assets and revenue from 
sale of non-current assets. External funds are measured by the amount of outstanding debt. The t-statistics of adjustment 
cost, optimal investment/capital ratio and market power parameters are calculated using delta method with analytical first 
derivatives. The model estimated corresponds to specifications derived assuming the firm maximizes the discounted present 
value of total dividends. Instrument sets include all real and financial variables lagged three periods or more. All regressions 
include the inverse of Mill’s Ratio to account for sample selection bias. 
* * * Denotes significance at 1% significance level. 
* *    Denotes significance at 5% significance level. 
*       Denotes significance at 10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates for Two-Component Investment Regression and Switching Equation1
Part 1 
Investment 
Equation2
Lagged Sales Twice Lagged 
Sales 
Lagged Cash 
Flow 
Twice Lagged 
Cash Flow 
Lagged 
Financial Slack 
Twice Lagged 
Financial Slack 
Constrained 
Regime 
0,012*** 
(19,12) 
0,010*** 
(15,06) 
0,015*** 
(12,98) 
0,012** 
(1,79) 
0,051*** 
(7,74) 
0,012** 
(2,12) 
N/Constrained 
Regime 
0,097*** 
(7,42) 
0,059* 
(1,29) 
0,004** 
(2,19) 
0,001 
(0,98) 
0,01 
(0,21) 
0,0005 
(1,23) 
Part 2 
Switching 
Equation3
Debt-to-Capital 
Ratio 
Liquidity-to-
Capital Ratio 
Int. Coverage – 
to – Sales Ratio 
Size   Age SBC
Coefficient 
Estimates 
0,019*** 
(9,87) 
-0,003*** 
(-4,42) 
0,087* 
(1,87) 
-0,039*** 
(-12,47) 
-0,103 
(1,42) 
-0,029** 
(-2,53) 
 Largest Largest 
Share*Dom Share 
Largest 
Share*For 
Largest 
Share*Man 
Largest 
Share*Emp 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates con’t  
0,025*** 
(3,88) 
0,057 
(0,45) 
0,032 
(0,98) 
-0,029 
(-1,25) 
0,012*** 
(13,25) 
 
1 * **- significant at 1% confidence level, ** - significant at 5% confidence level, * - significant at 10% confidence level. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics of 
coefficient estimates. 
2 The dependent variable is investment in fixed capital divided by lagged capital stock. The right hand side variables presented are also divided by lagged capital stock. 
Each estimated investment equation also includes a constant, time and industry dummies as well as the inverse of Mill’s ratio to account for selection bias.   
3 The dependent variable is an indicator taking value of 1 for firms classified as financially constrained and 0 for those classified as not financially constrained. The right 
hand side variables, other than time and industry dummies, enter in first lags.  
Table 6. The Average Probability of Being in the Financially Constrained Regime 
Over Time and Across Ownership Groups  
Ownership 
Group 
Year 
State Foreign Domestic Manager Employee 
1995 0,537 0,328 0,438 0,498 0,542 
1996 0,518 0,309 0,429 0,504 0,505 
1997 0,526 0,298 0,431 0,510 0,512 
1998 0,545 0,310 0,459 0,487 0,539 
1999 0,558 0,346 0,477 0,500 0,572 
 
 
 
